REPORT NO.1

Introduction

1. Decision to hold May 2007 elections


2. Election automation


3. Appointments to the Comelec


4. Election preparations


5. Application and approval of candidacies for senatorial positions


6. Application, manifestation, and approval of party-list groups


7. Pre-election campaign activities


8. Senatorial and party-list campaign


9. Election violence


10. Organizing for election monitoring

1. No–election scenario. The constitutional proposals in both initiatives, if approved in a plebiscite, would have instituted a unicameral parliamentary system and practically set aside the May 2007 elections. In their transitory provisions, they extended the terms of office of incumbent legislators and local officials beyond 2007. In effect, this would leave only the President, the Vice-President, and 12 senators as the only elective officials after June, 2007.
   
   The whole exercise has put the 2007 elections and all election stakeholders on the edge of uncertainty. The Comelec itself had to do some thinking and planning for a possible plebiscite—at a time when it was in the midst of election preparations.
   
   The late approval of the 2007 General Appropriation Act also threatened the holding of the 2007 elections. There are no funds specifically for the 2007 elections in the 2006 national budget and the Comelec savings cannot cover the expected expenses of the elections. This was however solved with the enactment of the 2007 budget in February 2007.
   
   The Comelec old main office building was burned down last March 11, 2007. This led to speculations that important documents related to the May 14 elections may have been burned and thus provides a basis for the postponement of the elections. This was however rejected by the Comelec which announced that “the fire of March 11, 2007 will not stop the elections in May from happening.”
   
   There is every reason to be vigilant regarding any possible “no-election” scenario that may derail the holding of the May 2007 elections, particularly in relation to the continuing crisis of legitimacy.



2. No-proclamation scenario. This is possible in a situation where the Comelec fails to finish the canvassing of votes for candidates. Chairman Benjamin Abalos, Jr. cites, as one possible source of this scenario, the new provision in Republic Act 9369 requiring the opening of actual election returns in case of “discrepancy, incompleteness, erasure or alteration” of certificate of canvass or supporting statement of votes.
   
   The no-proclamation scenario rests on what is perceived to be a defect of the 1987 constitution in stipulating that all terms of office of elected officials ends at 12:00 noon of June 30 following the May elections. This defect may lead to a situation where there is only one half of the Senate and the majority of the House of Representatives are not yet proclaimed—and therefore there is no Congress. A situation may then ensue where it is the Executive or the President presides over the whole affairs of the state and government.
   
   This situation basically subverts the republican check and balances and may lead to undermining of the democratic institutions.

1. Vacant position for commissioner. A seventh position remains vacant although there is a public clamor for the appointment of a new commissioner. The recent Philippine Election Forum, participated in by the Executive Department, also agreed to include this in its resolutions.



2. Credibility of the Commission. The credibility of the 2007 elections is heavily affected by the credibility of the Commission on Elections. The latter acts basically as a non-partisan body administering the electoral process.


However, Commissioner Virgilio Garcillano figured in 2004 elections in a much-publicized and controversial scandal involving an illegally-tapped telephone conversation purportedly between him and the incumbent president-cum-presidential candidate Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. The two of them were allegedly talking about committing electoral fraud in the presidential elections.

The scandal, despite the numerous investigations and public discussions into it, is seen as unfinished. In the process, it contributed to the lowering of public satisfaction over the performance of all involved accused.

Unfortunately, even the institution that is the Commission on Elections suffered a hit in public opinion. The last published survey of the 2006 SWS Enterprises Survey conducted from February-April 2006, indicated that the Comelec suffers a -59% net sincerity rating in fighting corruption.2

The appointment of new commissioners, as well as the willingness of the Comelec to open up to a certain extent its operations to the public should help alleviate this situation. Its initiatives in reforming itself, through OPLAN MERIT, an election Code of Conduct, and internal staff seminars, also helped.

A Handbook for Members of the Board of Election Inspectors was also jointly launched and developed by the COMELEC, DepEd and PPCRV – a first in Philippine elections history – last March 22, 2007.

However, its performance in the 2007 elections remains the major determinant in regaining the public trust in the institution.

1. Over-printing of ballots and other accountable forms. The mass media have, at various times, reported the Comelec estimate of registered voters as 49 million, 48 million, or 45 million. It also quoted various Comelec officials as stating that Comelec will print the ballots at either one-to-one correspondence with the actual number of registered voters or with extra percentage ranging from 3% to 15%. The fact is that, at this time, the Comelec has not yet come up with a definitive figure for registered voters. It still has to clarify exactly how many ballots it will print.



2. Security of the printing of accountable forms. The National Printing Office (NPO) is charged with exclusive printing of ballots and other accountable forms. There is concern however with the report that the NPO has subcontracted the printing to private printing presses. This needs to be investigated and monitored.
   
   There is also the reported case of three casual Comelec employees who were caught copying the serial numbers of ballots inside the NPO. This is of concern since the serial number is one of the principal means for verifying the authenticity of ballots.
   
   The corruption cases filed against the NPO chief Felipe Evardone led to his leave of absence. He is also the brother of the administration’s co-campaign manager Ben Evardone. Corruption cases place officials in a vulnerable position and can well lead to unwarranted pressures and blandishments.

1. Approval of too many applications for party-list elections. The number of party-list groups, both applicants and approved for participation in the party-list elections, are simply too many for practical handling. This will again tax the patience of voters, the BEIs, the BOCs, and everybody else. This situation may need to be investigated if this is the result of lax application of the 8-point criteria set by the Supreme Court.



2. Approval of application of party-list groups which are deemed extension of government agencies or headed by government officials. The case of Mamamayan Ayaw sa Droga (MAD) in 2001 was the classic case of government-funded projects turned into party-list projects. There are indications that this may again happen in the 2007 party-list elections. Eleven party-list groups are alleged to be either formed or led by government officials or their relatives or are extensions of government agencies. The approval of possible fake party-list groups which do not have a constituency or sectoral causes among marginalized sectors will add to the confusion and may provide a rich ground for electoral corruption.

1. Turncoatism. The unrestricted transfer of candidates from a party to the next party, either within a coalition or to the other side, severely undermines the political party system. It strengthens the role of the individual candidate, patronage politics, and political dynasties in the electoral and political processes.



2. Pre-campaign electioneering. A big number of candidates, both national and local, are observed to conduct pre-campaign propaganda activities through media and use of billboards, posters, and public occasions such as fiestas, birthdays of prominent people, holidays or anniversaries. These exploit a loophole in the election laws that define an election campaign to start upon the filing of a candidacy. This adds more expenses to the actual campaign of a candidate and unduly favors a more moneyed candidate.



3. 3. Non-regulation of pre-campaign electioneering. The proliferation of pre-campaign propaganda undermines not only the fair election character of democratic elections but also undermines the authority and role of the election administrator. Though the Comelec enjoys exclusive authority to enforce and administer all election laws and regulations, it has admitted that it cannot do anything about pre-campaign electioneering. The effective implementation of Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Law against premature campaigning is in doubt.

1. Weak prosecution of cases of violations of election campaign laws, particularly the Fair Elections Act. Despite the widespread violations of the laws and regulations on postering and common poster areas, the Comelec has yet to prosecute even one candidate on the matter. As a result, these candidates and their campaign workers are becoming bolder and bolder. There is a clear possibility that the local campaigns will worsen the violations. The case of candidate Luis “Chavit” Singson who was caught in camera giving money for a parlor game has still to be acted upon.



2. Inadequate enforcement and administration of election laws. The Comelec, under the Constitution, the Omnibus Election Code, and all other election laws, has the exclusive charge of the enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections for the purpose of ensuring free, orderly and honest elections. As such, it should have the power, on its own, to conduct investigations, determine violations, and prosecute violators of election laws. However, the current observed practice of the Comelec is only to act based on a complaint thereby putting the onus of responsibility on the complainant.



3. Use of government resources. Both during the pre-campaign period and during the campaign period, there was an observable increase in government projects in various areas. This needs to be correlated with the political campaigns of candidates or campaigns by their supporters who are in government. The activities of government officials, elected or appointed, also need to be monitored for connection with political campaigns.

1. Ineffectiveness of the gun ban. The gun ban was designed to prevent or lessen the occurrence of violent incidents during election period. There are two factors which are causes for concern: One, the proliferation of an estimated 250,000 unlicensed firearms; and second, the ongoing internal conflict in the country. These two factors mitigate and possibly may cancel any control brought about by the gun ban policy.



2. Possible involvement of police or military units and personnel in partisan election activities. There are already reports of partisan activities of some police and military units, especially in situations of intense local political rivalry, probable participation of retired police or military officials in local election contests, or in campaigns against perceived CPP-connected Left party-list groups.



3. Military intervention in the electoral process. Despite the memorandum of agreement between the Comelec and the AFP, there are new signs of renewed military intervention in the elections. There is the intent, given through the new secretary of national defense and retired police general Hermogenes Ebdane, Jr., of the willingness to use military units in transporting election paraphernalia or assistance in the electoral process itself. There are the announcements from the police of requests for military assistance in their electoral duties. There is the anti-Left party-list group propaganda campaign in poor Metro-Manila communities and other urban areas.



4. Rebel intervention in the electoral process. The Communist Party of the Philippines and the New People’s Army have reiterated their policy and actual conduct of issuing permits-to-campaign (PTCs) in their claimed areas of control to campaigning candidates in exchange for either weapons, cash, or political concessions. The main bargaining chip is their actual or threat of use of force against those who refuse to get these PTCs.