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FPJ: Will He Run, Will He Win?
December, 2003
Fernando Poe, Jr. is “Da King” in movie world. However, if some
oppositionists would have it, they would want him the king (or
president) of the country comes 2004 elections.
FPJ is being touted as a unifying figure of the opposition, acceptable
to all groups. His inexperience in public office is actually being
promoted as a positive factor in his candidacy, hoping that this can be
turned to votes by the vast section of the electorate alienated by
corrupt and self-serving traditional politicians.
Will he run? Will he win?
The Anatomy of the Actor-Politician
Movie and other media personalities are attracted to the political arena
not only by personal ambitions but also by the demonstrated opportunity
for winning a popular election. Media exposure and image buildup, which
has become the staple of all candidates for important offices in the
information age, is a natural asset of the actor-politician. One might
add, so are make-believe promises and public demagoguery a natural
talent for a bad actor-politician.
Genuine public service and governance skills are unfortunately only a
function of public perception of a candidate’s image. A governor may be
good in governance but if the public perceives him or her as corrupt,
human rights violator or anti-people, that is the end of his or her
candidacy. Conversely, an inept administrator, a gambler, or a womanizer
can get elected into office riding a skillful public relations campaign
that portrays a pro-people image.
This built-in popularity and good public image of a “bida” media
personality places an actor in an enviable position of at least a dark
horse or possibly a front-runner in our national elections. The higher
the position, face-to-face contact or direct knowledge of a candidate
and his qualifications lose their importance—media exposure takes their
place as source of voter perception.
This works in an electoral environment where the so-called “market
votes,” as differentiated from “command votes,” prevail. The latter are
votes already pledged to local political leaders and can be negotiated
among politicians. The former are not influenced by local political
lords. On a national scale, market votes outnumber command votes,
particularly in urbanized areas. It is no coincidence that urbanized
areas also constitute the viewer base of the television networks.
In 1994, television commands 56.7 percent viewership as compared to
radio’s 80.8 percent. However, it can be conceded that, wherever it
reach, TV proved to be a more compelling medium than radio or even
printed media.
This was borne out by the number one finish of senators Loren Legarda
and Noli de Castro, both ABS-CBN news anchors, in their respective
senatorial contests as first-timers. Multimedia, such as movies,
television, VCD/DVD, and cable have more capabilities for name recall,
image production, and product sale than other types of media. It is no
wonder that television garnered 66 percent of the available advertising
budget.
The 1995 IPER study of the Filipino voter validated the voter preference
for the sikat and popular candidate, more than any other criteria. The
study, in turn, was validated by the 1998 presidential election, which
saw Joseph Ejercito barging into Malacañang behind his screen name
Joseph “Erap” Estrada.
If and when FPJ decides to run, part of the basis of his decision will
most likely be his assessment of his popularity with the masses, to the
extent that they would vote for him.
To Run Or Not to Run
Even for someone who excels in national surveys, running for presidency
of the country is not an easy decision to make. Beyond popularity, one
has to factor in several other key factors into the decision. Among
these are one’s financial and material resources, the political
machinery available for campaign, handling of election irregularities,
relations with local political lords and power brokers, and
vulnerability to possible electoral issues that may be raised against a
candidate.
Popularity may be a major, if not the most important factor, for a
presidential candidate. Certainly, it pays to be high on the “name
recall” list of the voters. However, as Nora Aunor learned in her
ill-fated excursion into local Bicol politics, this is not the be-all
and end-all of a political candidacy.
This is particularly true for presidential candidacy. Former senator
Raul Roco topped the survey for 1998 presidential race for quite
sometime during the early part of the campaign. He lost—a victim of a
shortage of resources and limited national campaign machinery. Again, he
is high in the national surveys for the 2004 presidential race, but he
still has the same handicap.
FPJ would have much the same initial handicap as Roco. In addition he
does not have a record of public service in any capacity, unlike Roco
and even Estrada. The latter was a mayor and a senator before he became
president.
He cannot even be compared to Cory Aquino, the housewife who was thrust
upon the national political center stage by Ninoy Aquino’s political
assassination. Cory belongs to two political families—the Cojuangcos and
Sumulongs and married into the political Aquino family.
FPJ, if and when he decides to run, has no political background to speak
of, other than his association with Estrada and the latter’s political
friends. The only capital he will bring to the presidential race is his
popular standing with the masses. FPJ will be the proverbial babe in the
land of the wolves.
This does not mean that FPJ can be discounted in the 2004 presidential
elections. As it is, his popularity may be enough to get him through,
particularly under a campaign situation of unpopular opponents or a
large negative vote against the incumbent president.
However, he will have to solve the problem of resources, machinery, and
network. Even the much-vaunted Estrada campaign for the 1998 election
entailed a huge resource base, widespread and well-oiled machinery, and
extensive network.
A presidential candidate needs to accumulate at least two to three
billion peso campaign chest, according to many political analysts. Then
he had to form a nationwide coalition of parties and groups. A support
network in mass media, business, church and religious groups, military
and police, and government also need to be in place.
The scenario where an FPJ candidacy is possible is one where the
opposition would need to have a unifying popular figure but not a
politically-savvy one. Unification and having a popular candidate are
necessary in order to maximize campaign efforts against President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo who will have built-in advantages of being an
incumbent. Political innocence translates into a stronger role for
advisers in the winner’s governance and larger political and economic
profits later.
To do this, both NPC’s Danding Cojuangco and LDP’s Senator Panfilo
Lacson, as well as all other possible opposition presidentiables will
have to step aside. If they do not do so, then an FPJ candidacy has
little chances of coming about.
Three personal factors that may figure in FPJ’s eventual decision are
his family’s position, the effect on his movie career, and his
friendship with Erap. He would need his family’s public support in a
very public, and possibly bruising, campaign. He also will have to
assess the consequences and accept his leaving a comfortable career
where he reigns. His friendship with Erap is well-known and may tip the
balance.
At any rate, an FPJ candidacy will follow the now conventional wisdom in
Philippine politics—that of a winnable media figure.
Prospects For An FPJ Presidency
The three-billion peso question, of course, is: will FPJ becomes the
next Philippine president?
The answer runs the whole gamut of possibilities. The question is moot
and academic if he chooses not to run or if the opposition fails to pick
him. If he runs as an independent candidate without the opposition
parties and groups behind him, there is only a slim chance that his
popularity will be enough to get him into the winning column.
The more interesting scenario is if FPJ runs under a united opposition
banner. This translates into two possibilities: one, a mano-a-mano with
president GMA as candidate of the dominant coalition and, two, a more
dispersed field of presidential candidates.
In a one-on-one situation, where the two sides have major available
machineries and resources, FPJ will have an edge in the popularity among
the D and E groups of voters. He will also gather votes from anti-GMA
voters in the C group. In this case, all other things being equal, there
is a clear possibility of an FPJ victory.
However, as more candidates enter the fray, both of them will lose
votes. Who will lose more will depend on which side of the electoral
issue or issues the people think these other candidates locate
themselves.
If these other candidates carry issues like the ones FPJ will carry,
then their votes subtract from him. However, if they carry GMA’s issue,
then it will be the other way around.
The role of a popular vice-president is not a crucial factor as
president GMA herself prove when she failed to raise Speaker Jose de
Venecia’s votes against Estrada while running away with the 1998
vice-presidential post.
A so-called “third force” that carries issues against both will find a
hard time fending off both and still maintains momentum in the popular
mind. It is however conceivable, given the high level of the negative
votes in the coming election, that such a third-way presidential
candidate can attract enough votes. It would largely depend on the
swings of the campaign as voters respond to campaign issues.
Another major factor to consider is the loyalty of local political
lords. Since there is a very weak political party system in the
Philippines, it is possible for a presidential candidate to raid the
political bases of his or her opponent. In the post-martial law
Philippine politics, it is a phenomenon that a national candidate will
always have local support—at the provincial and town levels—from varied
parties and groups including the partymates of his or her opponent.
An FPJ presidency is certainly a possibility. However, he and his fellow
oppositionists will have to work very hard for it. Popularity alone will
not win him his day in Malacañang.
Prospects of An FPJ Administration
Assuming further that FPJ wins, what are the prospects of his
administration? This is a relevant question considering the fate of his
friend’s stay in power. Erap failed to sustain the full six years of his
term and was unceremoniously booted out after a failed impeachment bid
transformed into a spectacular rerun of people power.
Certainly, FPJ and his advisers would have learned their lessons.
However, almost certainly, various interests of people in the coalition
will rear their heads and attempt to shape the national agenda and
policy. All is well and good if these interests coincided with the
interests of the whole nation. If not, FPJ will be called upon to make a
monumental decision on whether to bend to these interests or to chart a
bold one based on his campaign promises.
One of the immediate decisions that an FPJ administration will have to
make are the appointments to key government positions—some 14,000
positions, ranging from national to provincial ones requiring
presidential approval. The other immediate decision is the handling of
lucrative agencies, government corporations, and economic regulatory
bodies.
Interests that literally invested in him—providing the billion-peso
campaign war chest—expect profit returns on their investment. Power
players will expect commensurate roles in the new government.
Potentially, an FPJ administration will have the means to ward off these
vested interests. The same mass support that will have provided the
winning votes is the same support that can guarantee its strong
independence from vested interests. However, it would mean confrontation
with the latter.
The odds are that an FPJ administration will be subject to and dependent
on internal advice and on external pressure. His very inexperience will
work against him. It is a government that will prove very difficult to
rise above its advisers.
The business community is already waiting with bated breath an FPJ
presidency. Soaring peso exchange rates and stock market fluctuations
show a very much disturbed economic sector. Economy, as in the Erap and
other previous administrations, is the main challenge of an FPJ
government.
Will FPJ prove equal to the challenge? Or more accurately, will his
economic advisers be equal to the challenge? Unfortunately for us, the
answer cannot be discerned as we go to the polls.
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