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Role of Governments and Legislatures in Promoting Asian Democracy: The
Philippine Case
Paper
prepared for the Asian Civil Society Forum for Democracy (ACSFD) held in
Ulanbaatar, Mongolia on June 28-30, 2006.
Introduction
Governments, as commonly defined, are “the organization, machinery, or
agency through which a political unit exercises authority and performs
functions and which is usually classified according to the distribution
of power within it.1” A legislature, in this same context is “an
organized body having the authority to make laws for a political unit.”2
It is a basic observation that governments and legislatures, by
themselves, do not guarantee democracy. They are, in their primordial
function, exercise authority within a state. Whether that authority is
used to maintain, develop, and strengthen democracy is a question that
is only answerable by the process by which the state is constituted.
Obviously, a state constituted based on the political will of a single
leader, a small group of people, and even an elite class in society, has
a complementary government (and when existing, a legislature) that
expresses this political will. A democracy—based as it is on the consent
of the governed—requires the state to be based on the whole body of its
citizenry expressing their political will in free and fair political
processes.
Having said this, there exists a whole spectrum of varying levels of
democratization—from democracy struggling to be born within a
non-democratic state to a transitional democratic state and to a
full-fledged democratic state. Asia, in particular, exhibits this
bewildering array of non-democratic and democratic state processes.
Asian states, as members of the United Nations, formally adhere to the
tenets of democracy and its human rights foundations. A recent example
is expressed in the 5th Section on Human Rights, Democracy, and
Governance of the United Nations Millennium Declaration by the UN
General Assembly, to wit:
“We will spare no effort to promote democracy and strengthen the rule of
law, as well as respect for all internationally recognized human rights
and fundamental freedoms, including the right to development.”3
However, the reality is that Asian states have differing concepts of
democracy and even human rights and often their practice contradicts
even their own concepts, not to mention internationally-agreed
standards.
It is therefore an interesting exercise to discuss strategies in
handling or engaging Asian governments and legislatures given this
reality.
This paper proposes to outline one such strategy as applied to the
Philippine government and legislature. The latter is of course
functioning within the ambit of a transitional post-Marcos democratic
state. This basically requires the establishment or reestablishment—and
the strengthening—of democratic institutions destroyed in the 13 years
of the Marcos dictatorship.
It especially discusses the basic processes that “people power,” which
toppled the dictatorship, went through in the post-Marcos period of
rebuilding Philippine democracy. In this, this paper hopes to contribute
some lessons for Asian civil society activists who have their own
democracy advocacies and struggles.
People Power and the Overthrow of the Marcos Dictatorship
People power toppled the Marcos dictatorship. However, the dramatic
events of February 1986 when more than a million people gathered outside
the main military and police camps in support of a failed coup were only
the culmination of a failed Marcos snap elections. It, in turn, was
preceded by the two-year sustained people’s mobilizations inspired by
Benigno “Ninoy” Aquino’s martyrdom in August 1983 and a 13-year
multi-faceted anti-dictatorship struggle.
From 1972 to 1986, the Marcos dictatorship basically constituted the
government. A rubber-stamp national assembly was also installed by
Marcos in 1978 to provide the semblance of a democratic state before an
increasingly critical international community and an openly restive
people.
By 1983, major sectors of the people and the political opposition were
aggressively on the move against the dictatorship. Marcos himself was
weakening, both politically and physically.
Exiled former senator Aquino decided to come home despite desperate
warnings from the dictator’s close circle. He was assassinated when his
plane landed at the airport. The ensuing two weeks of spontaneous grief
and the massive mobilization of more than two million people for his
funeral spelled the beginning of the end of the Marcos dictatorship.
They also acted as a dry-run and previewed the epochal events of people
power two years later in EDSA.4
In 1984, both the National Democratic Front (NDF)5 and the democratic
opposition of various stripes united under the Coalition for the
Restoration of Democracy (CORD) and undertook a series of
ever-increasing nationwide mobilizations challenging the dictatorship.
This was complemented by various support activities, including
international solidarity campaigns, unrest within the armed forces, and
armed struggle by underground forces.
Marcos was politically isolated both inside the country and
internationally. As the economy suffered, pressure began to build upon
Marcos to demonstrate his capability to govern and maintain his rule. He
decided in 1985 to hold snap elections, believing that he can control
the outcome through his tight grip on the election process and his local
political bases. He also thought that the political opposition was too
fragmented and weak to effectively contest in the elections.
However, the opposition not only unified behind Ninoy Aquino’s widow but
captured the nation’s imagination. This was despite the boycott by the
NDF forces who predicted a Marcos electoral fraud—they having prepared
instead for a post-electoral civil war.
The people thought otherwise as their political awareness and
determination matured. Angered by the Marcos electoral cheating and
provided the flashpoint of the failed coup d’etat by the Marcos defense
minister and police chief, they rallied behind Cory Aquino and Cardinal
Sin in a four-day people power revolution.
Marcos was forced to leave the country when even the US government and
the rest of the international community deserted him. He died in exile
in Hawaii.
The Post-Marcos Constitutional Democracy
When Marcos left the Malacañang Palace on February 25, 1986, he left
behind a legacy of destroyed democratic institutions, a politicized
military, a warped governmental organization, and an economy in deep
debt crisis.
President Corazon Aquino declared a revolutionary government—based on
the successful people power revolution—and revoked the Marcos
constitution. She proclaimed the “Freedom Constitution” in order to
prepare the ground for a transition to a democratic political system.
In February 7, 1987, the people overwhelmingly approved the 1987
Constitution. This constitution is in force and effect for the last 20
years of the post-Marcos democracy. It has not been amended although the
three succeeding presidents (Ramos, Estrada, and Arroyo) have tried or
is trying to make their own revisions or amendments to the fundamental
law of the land.6
The 1987 constitution mandated the attainment of full democracy for the
Philippines, encompassing the whole people. It restored the presidential
system with restricted powers for the president. It also broadened
people’s participation in governance with a party-list system and role
for non-governmental organizations. It also mandated the establishment
of a multiparty political system and banned political dynasties.
However, because of the urgent requirement to stabilize the Aquino
regime against the strong remnants of the dictatorship, the
constitutional framers resorted to quick compromises finish their tasks.
In many important but controversial provisions, they left it to Congress
to pass enabling laws.
The peace negotiations with the National Democratic Front (NDF) faltered
amidst coup threats from the military and distrust on both sides. Human
rights violations, including assassinations, arrests, and forced
disappearances, were carried out against the NDF forces. This forced the
latter to call for the continuation of the armed struggle, this time
against what it perceived as a US-backed Aquino government.
The weak Aquino regime was besieged throughout its rule by coup d’etat
attempts and threats. It later compromised with the military and former
Marcos forces. It removed progressive allies from its government,
carried out a total war against the NDF forces, supported the entry of
military people into the civilian posts, and permitted former Marcos
cronies to return to the country.
On the other hand, the NDF forces split on questions of strategy. In
1992, a significant part decided to recognize the democratic space
created after the downfall of Marcos and take part in the parliamentary
arena. The Communist Party of the Philippines and the New People’s Army
(NPA) reaffirmed the strategy of a protracted people’s war.
The Ramos government resumed peace negotiations in 1992 with the NDF,
the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), and the Rebolusyonaryong
Alyansang Makabayan-Soldiers of the Filipino People-Young Officers Union
(RAM-SFP-YOU).7 It succeeded in hammering out peace agreements with the
RAM-SFP-YOU and the MNLF. However, another Moro rebel group, the Moro
Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) did not participate in the negotiations
and younger cadres of the MNLF founded the Abu Sayyaf—an Islamist group
allied to Jemaah Islamiya and linked to Al Quida.
The government failed to get an agreement with the NDF. However, forces
identified with the latter took advantage of the democratic space to
participate in the open people’s movement and later, in the party-list
elections.
Throughout most of the 1990s, there was a relatively low level of
political tension as the constitutional reforms took root and the
internal conflicts abated. Civil society engagements with government
increased and non-governmental organizations participated in party-list
and local electoral contests.
However, not all reforms were implemented, particularly those dealing
with the dismantling of the Marcos-promoted economic and political elite
and the development of a strong political party system. The military
also enjoyed continued political favors and remained a distinct
political block. Likewise, religious groups grew in power and influence
as they substituted for political party bases.
Personality politics replaced platform-based politics. Movie actors and
other popular figures joined seasoned traditional politicians in
government. It reached a high point in the election of Joseph Ejercito8
to the presidency.
Joseph “Erap” Ejercito Estrada proved to be incompetent and corrupt. In
2000, he was subjected to an impeachment trial. However, the effort of
his Senate supporters to shield him aroused the ire of the people and
ignited what came to be known as People Power 2 or EDSA 2.
Then Vice-President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo benefited from the ouster of
Estrada. She became the fourth president of the post-Marcos republic on
the heels of Estrada’s departure.
However, the Estrada group never accepted the constitutionality of his
ouster. They staged the so-called “EDSA Tres” to storm Malacañang
Palace, the seat of presidential power. Failing in this, they joined the
political opposition in the both exposing the various corruption
scandals in the Arroyo administration. They also supported the candidacy
of another movie personality, Fernando Poe, Jr. in the 2004 elections.
From the start, the Arroyo administration was under siege from her
political opposition. In the absence of major political and economic
reforms as mandated by EDSA 2, her support eroded. With major corruption
scandals also hounding her, even her EDSA 2 supporters distanced
themselves from her.
Facing a popular opposition candidate in the 2004 elections, President
Arroyo cobbled together a coalition of traditional politicians, many of
whom were former Marcos cronies and carried out an expensive campaign,
using both government and her coalition resources.
She won the presidential election by a small margin of over a million
votes. Accusations of electoral cheating ensued. This reached a
crescendo when tapes of her conversations with an election commissioner
came to light. Calls for her resignation or ouster have since been heard
from all sides. Ten members of her Cabinet resigned over the issue.
President Arroyo fought all pressures, maneuvering and using all the
resources at her disposal. Her government is now a government of
survival.
She consolidated her support from the ruling coalition, in the House of
Representatives and among local officials. She however lost in the
Senate and in public opinion.
In the process of the crisis, almost all post-Marcos political
institutions became victim. They were attacked or put under tremendous
pressure.
At the moment, they are holding. On February 24, 2006, President Arroyo
declared a state of emergency, ostensibly to pre-empt a coup attempt
against her. Her close associates announced new martial law powers under
the emergency, such as takeover of key facilities, including media
facilities, warrantless arrests of opponents, and the absolute ban on
public rallies.
Other members of the Cabinet did not agree. The armed forces also
refused to implement these “new” powers. Opposition rose among the
various sectors and from the international community. She had to lift it
after only a week of ineffectiveness. Eventually, the Supreme Court
struck down these provisions of the proclamation as unconstitutional.
Government Role in Promoting Democracy
The Philippine experience of the post-Marcos democracy points to the
crucial role of the government in promoting democracy. It represents the
focal point for rebuilding the various institutions of democracy
destroyed by the Marcos dictatorship. It also is the constitutional
structure for ensuring the growth of democracy even as it removes all
vestiges of non-democratic practices.
The Aquino government enjoyed the popular support of the
anti-dictatorship forces as well as the people. It also has a very high
level of support and recognition of the international community. It has
the unenviable opportunity to correct historical errors and problems
besetting the nation and institute the necessary political and social
reforms to build and consolidate Philippine democracy.
It and succeeding governments failed to achieve even the
constitutionally-mandated reforms. All of them, in their own time,
succumbed to the temptations of power. Accusations of corruption dogged
their every step.
They also failed to go beyond the short-sighted interests of the
economic and political elite they represented. As a result, the
economic, social and cultural conditions of the lower classes
deteriorated even when the whole economy improved.
The role of democratic governments, in the Philippine experience, in
fostering democracy consists of the following:
1. Building or strengthening democratic institutions both inside and
outside government such as the legislature, the courts, electoral
bodies, political parties, anti-corruption agencies, human rights
monitors, the mass media, civil society organizations, and local
assemblies;
2. Nurturing a democratic culture in society, particularly in the
military and police agencies;
3. Opening democratic dialogues with alienated sectors, especially those
involved in internal conflicts; and
4. Instituting democratic political processes such as free and fair
elections, direct democratic practices of referenda, recall and
initiatives, and people’s consultations.
Philippine Congress and Democracy
The Philippine Congress, with its two houses, stands as the national
legislature in the Philippines. The Senate is the upper house,
consisting of 24 senators, half of whom are elected every three years in
alternate elections for individual terms of six years. The House of
Representatives is the lower house, consisting of at least 209 single
district representatives plus qualified party-list representatives.
Since the 1987 constitution went into effect, six Congresses have been
convened. The party-list system, requiring a congressional enabling law,
was only instituted in 1998.
Contemporary congresses have increasingly become an acrimonious
institution and weakened vis-a-vis the executive branch. The two houses
are often at loggerheads with the president and with each other, slowing
down, if not bringing to a halt, necessary governance measures.
An example is the reenacted national budget of 2005 due to the failure
of Congress and the president to agree on the 2006 national budget in
time. Budget re-enactment and languishment of urgent bills in both
houses have often plagued Congress. What is observable is the sharp rise
in congressional hearings, supposedly in aid of legislation but usually
for partisan or publicity purposes.
Unfortunately, the check and balance as enshrined in the constitution
has not been effectively implemented. The president enjoys vast powers
even with the constitutional restrictions on martial law powers. The
Marcos expanded powers over the national budget and appointment of
senior and middle-level government officials have been retained in the
presidency.9
These have been used time and again by post-Marcos presidents to
accumulate still more powers and undermine other branches of
governments, including constitutional bodies. With the absence of strong
political parties, the president builds his or her own coalitions in
Congress, giving rise to the phenomenon of political turncoatism.
Congress, as any legislature elected directly by the people, has the
potential to institute democratic legislations and check other branches
of government. Aside from its lawmaking powers, congressional budgetary
and oversight powers can be used to advance the democratic aspirations
of the people. Their easy access to mass media and opinion-makers can
also be used for democratic advocacy.
In the Philippines, the record has been spotty. For example, the Senate
has been able to retain its independence because of their national
constituency.10 However, the lower house is peopled by members of
regional or provincial political dynasties. They are usually vulnerable
to pork barrel politics and presidential favors.
The hegemony of elite politics in both houses undermines the expansion
of democracy to include the interests of the vast majority of Filipinos.
This is despite the entry of genuine representatives from lower classes
through the party-list system.11
The only way to ensure the democratic agenda is not lost but is advanced
in Congress is to win the majority, by either electing genuine people’s
representatives, systematic lobby by people’s organizations or
developing democratic coalitions within.
Civil Society Engagement with Government
Current civil society engagement in politics and governance is directly
traceable to the 1986 people power revolution and the anti-dictatorship
struggle. There are big differences however in how various civil society
groups approach the question of engagement with government.
Some non-governmental organizations and people’s organizations are open
to participation in government as elected or appointed officials while
others are strongly against it. Some are open to engaging in political
talks (supporting or endorsing political parties and candidates) while
others are averse to it. Many are open to lobbying Congress and other
government agencies while others do not want even to talk to government.
These ambivalent attitudes led to a considerable hesitation in various
engagements with government, particularly in electoral contests. A
vacuum was created wherein genuine representatives and leaders of
grassroots-based sectors found it impossible to win even local seats.
Traditional politicians, including former Marcos cronies, regrouped and
successfully returned to their elective and appointive posts.
The considerable mass base of the anti-dictatorship movement was split
between the NDF and various legal Left or even traditional political
parties. The NDF, of course, remained outside the constitutional order
and only consider participating party-list and local elections for
tactical reasons. The others, up to now, do not yet have the strength to
go beyond the party-list system.
A promising trend, however, is the lessening resistance of civil society
organizations and their leaders to direct participation in the electoral
and governance processes, either as elective officials or NGO partners.
A slow but sure transformation of the issue-based constituency to a
vote-based electoral constituency is evident.
Many in the civil society movement have realized the considerable
opportunities—and necessity—in fielding their own leaders in the
electoral contests. They increasingly realize that this position does
not compromise—but rather enhance—their advocacies. After all, the
government is still the most potent force in implementing the reforms
and policies civil society organizations are advocating for.
Some Lessons and Recommendations
The first lesson in Philippine experience is to democratize the state,
government and society. The second lesson is to strengthen this
democratization to full democracy enjoyed by all the people. The third
lesson is to realize that democracy is a never-ending work that requires
constant vigilance and attention.
Governments are a neutral agency—they are there to govern or translate a
state’s policy and program into executable measures. Genuine democratic
governments are products of a democratic state power. Without such a
state, the immediate aim and focus of democratic forces can only be its
achievement. So it was with the struggle against the Marcos
dictatorship; so it will be in other countries as well.
Democratic governments, in turn, have a responsibility to complete the
democratization process, whether internally or in society at large. Even
at the international level, it is increasingly recognized that
democracies have a responsibility to defend and promote the idea of
democracy everywhere it is challenged.
Democratic legislatures, as part of government, have a key role to play
in advancing the cause of democracy in its various functions of
lawmaking, budgeting, and oversight.
Civil society organizations—with a democratic orientation—have the
responsibility to infuse and engage governments and legislatures
everywhere in the democratic dialogue. They must secure the democratic
character of political institutions, even if it requires electing their
own representatives into governments and legislatures.
We all must do our part in developing the enabling environment for
democracy in our own countries, in Asia, and in the whole world.
June 26, 2006.
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